Abstract | One problem that frequently arises is the establishment of a
secure connection between two network nodes. There are many key
establishment protocols that are based on Trusted Third Parties or
public key cryptography which are in use today. However, in the
case of networks with frequently changing topology and size
composed of nodes of limited computation power, such as the ad-hoc
and sensor networks, such an approach is difficult to apply. One
way of attacking this problem for such networks is to have the two
nodes share some piece of information that will, subsequently,
enable them to transform this information into a shared
communication key.
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Having each pair of network nodes share some piece of information
is, often, achieved through appropriate \em key pre-distribution
schemes. These schemes work by equipping each network node with a
set of candidate key values, some of which shared with other
network nodes possessing other keys sets. Later, when two nodes
meet, they can employ a suitable key establishment protocol in
order to locate shared values and used them for the creation of
the communication key.
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In this paper we give a formal definition of collusion resistant
key predistribution schemes and then propose such a scheme based
on probabilistically created set systems. The resulting key sets
are shown to have a number of desirable properties that ensure the
confidentiality of communication sessions against collusion
attacks by other network nodes. |