| Type of publication: | Inproceedings |
| Entered by: | |
| Title | Counting Stable Strategies in Random Evolutionary Games |
| Bibtex cite ID | RACTI-RU1-2005-36 |
| Booktitle | International Symposium on Algorithms and Computation (ISAAC 2005) |
| Year published | 2005 |
| Pages | 839-848 |
| Publisher | Springer - Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006 |
| URL | http://www.cs.cityu.edu.hk/~isaac2005/ |
| Abstract | In this paper we study the notion of the Evolutionary Stable
Strategies (ESS) in evolutionary games and we demonstrate their qualitative
difference from the Nash Equilibria, by showing that a random
evolutionary game has on average exponentially less number of ESS than
the number of Nash Equilibria in the underlying symmetric 2-person
game with random payoffs. |
| Authors | |
Topics
| |
| BibTeX | BibTeX |
| RIS | RIS |
| Attachments |
|
ISAAC2005.pdf (main file) |
|
| Publication ID | 350 |
