Type of publication: | Inproceedings |
Entered by: | |
Title | Symmetry in Network Congestion Games: Pure Equilibria and Anarchy Cost |
Bibtex cite ID | RACTI-RU1-2005-39 |
Booktitle | 3rd Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA 2005) |
Year published | 2005 |
Pages | 161-175 |
URL | http://www.cs.le.ac.uk/people/te17/WAOA2005/ |
Abstract | We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of
Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose
a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equilibrium
with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm
each user plays only once and allocates her traffic to a path selected via
a shortest path computation. We then show that this algorithm works
for series-parallel networks when users are identical or when users are of
varying demands but have the same best response strategy for any initial
network traffic. We also give constructions where the algorithm fails if
either the above condition is violated (even for series-parallel networks)
or the network is not series-parallel (even for identical users). Thus, we
essentially indicate the limits of the applicability of this greedy approach.
We also study the price of anarchy for the objective of maximum
latency. We prove that for any network of m uniformly related links and
for identical users, the price of anarchy is È( logm
log logm). |
Authors | |
Topics
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BibTeX | BibTeX |
RIS | RIS |
Attachments | |
Publication ID | 353 |