In 1876 Charles Lutwidge Dodgson suggested the intriguing voting rule that today bears his name. Although Dodg- son's rule is one of the most well-studied voting rules, it suf- fers from serious deciencies, both from the computational point of view|it is NP-hard even to approximate the Dodg- son score within sublogarithmic factors|and from the social choice point of view|it fails basic social choice desiderata such as monotonicity and homogeneity. In a previous paper [Caragiannis et al., SODA 2009] we have asked whether there are approximation algorithms for Dodgson's rule that are monotonic or homogeneous. In this paper we give denitive answers to these questions. We de- sign a monotonic exponential-time algorithm that yields a 2-approximation to the Dodgson score, while matching this result with a tight lower bound. We also present a monotonic polynomial-time O(logm)-approximation algorithm (where m is the number of alternatives); this result is tight as well due to a complexity-theoretic lower bound. Furthermore, we show that a slight variation of a known voting rule yields a monotonic, homogeneous, polynomial-time O(mlogm)- approximation algorithm, and establish that it is impossible to achieve a better approximation ratio even if one just asks for homogeneity. We complete the picture by studying sev- eral additional social choice properties; for these properties, we prove that algorithms with an approximation ratio that depends only on m do not exist.