We study a problem of scheduling client requests to servers.
Each client has a particular latency requirement at each server and may
choose either to be assigned to some server in order to get serviced provided
that her latency requirement is met or not to participate in the
assignment at all. From a global perspective, in order to optimize the
performance of such a system, one would aim to maximize the number
of clients that participate in the assignment. However, clients may behave
selfishly in the sense that each of them simply aims to participate
in an assignment and get serviced by some server where her latency requirement
is met with no regard to the overall system performance. We
model this selfish behavior as a strategic game, show how to compute
equilibria efficiently, and assess the impact of selfishness on system performance.
We also show that the problem of optimizing performance is
computationally hard to solve, even in a coordinated way, and present
efficient approximation and online algorithms.