Abstract: Consider a network vulnerable to viral infection. The system security software can guarantee
safety only to a limited part of the network. Such limitations result from economy costs or processing
costs. The problem raised is to which part of the network the security software should
be installed, so that to secure as much as possible the network. We model this practical network
scenario as a non-cooperative multi-player game on a graph, with two kinds of players, a set
of attackers and a protector player, representing the viruses and the system security software,
respectively. Each attacker player chooses a node of the graph (or a set of them, via a probability
distribution) to infect. The protector player chooses independently, in a basic case of the
problem, a simple path or an edge of the graph (or a set of them, via a probability distribution)
and cleans this part of the network from attackers. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability
of escaping its cleaning by the protector. In contrast, the protector aims at maximizing
the expected number of cleaned attackers. We call the two games obtained from the two basic
cases considered, as the Path and the Edge model, respectively. For these two games, we are
interested in the associated Nash equilibria, where no network entity can unilaterally improve
its local objective. We obtain the following results:
• The problem of existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete for the Path model.
This opposed to that, no instance of the Edge model possesses a pure Nash equilibrium,
proved in [7].
• In [7] a characterization of mixed Nash equilibria for the Edge model is provided. However,
that characterization only implies an exponential time algorithm for the general case.
Here, combining it with clever exploration of properties of various practical families of
graphs, we compute, in polynomial time, mixed Nash equilibria on corresponding graph
instances. These graph families include, regular graphs, graphs that can be decomposed, in
polynomially time, into vertex disjoint r-regular subgraphs, graphs with perfect matchings
and trees.
• We utilize the notion of social cost [6] for measuring system performance on such scenario;
here is defined to be the utility of the protector. We prove that the corresponding Price of
Anarchy in any mixed Nash equilibria of the game is upper and lower bounded by a linear
function of the number of vertices of the graph.
Abstract: Consider a network vulnerable to viral infection, where the security software can guarantee safety only to a limited part of it. We model this practical network scenario as a non-cooperative multi-player game on a graph, with two kinds of players, a set of attackers and a protector player, representing the viruses and the system security software, respectively. We are interested in the associated Nash equilibria, where no network entity can unilaterally improve its local objective. We obtain the following results: for certain families of graphs, mixed Nash equilibria can be computed in polynomially time. These families include, among others, regular graphs, graphs with perfect matchings and trees. The corresponding price of anarchy for any mixed Nash equilibria of the game is upper and lower bounded by a linear function of the number of vertices of the graph. (We define the price of anarchy to reflect the utility of the protector). Finally, we introduce a generalised version of the game. We show that the existence problem of pure Nash equilibria here is NP complete.
Abstract: Consider k particles, 1 red and k–1 white, chasing each other on the nodes of a graph G. If the red one catches one of the white, it ldquoinfectsrdquo it with its color. The newly red particles are now available to infect more white ones. When is it the case that all white will become red? It turns out that this simple question is an instance of information propagation between random walks and has important applications to mobile computing where a set of mobile hosts acts as an intermediary for the spread of information.
In this paper we model this problem by k concurrent random walks, one corresponding to the red particle and k–1 to the white ones. The infectiontime Tk of infecting all the white particles with red color is then a random variable that depends on k, the initial position of the particles, the number of nodes and edges of the graph, as well as on the structure of the graph.
We easily get that an upper bound on the expected value of Tk is the worst case (over all initial positions) expected meeting time m* of two random walks multiplied by THgr (log k). We demonstrate that this is, indeed, a tight bound; i.e. there is a graph G (a special case of the ldquolollipoprdquo graph), a range of values k
Abstract: Consider k particles, 1 red and k-1 white, chasing each other on the nodes of a graph G. If the red one catches one of the white, it “infects” it with its color. The newly red particles are now available to infect more white ones. When is it the case that all white will become red? It turns out that this simple question is an instance of information propagation between random walks and has important applications to mobile computing where a set of mobile hosts acts as an intermediary for the spread of information.
In this paper we model this problem by k concurrent random walks, one corresponding to the red particle and k-1 to the white ones. The infectiontime Tk of infecting all the white particles with red color is then a random variable that depends on k, the initial position of the particles, the number of nodes and edges of the graph, as well as on the structure of the graph.
In this work we develop a set of probabilistic tools that we use to obtain upper bounds on the (worst case w.r.t. initial positions of particles) expected value of Tk for general graphs and important special cases. We easily get that an upper bound on the expected value of Tk is the worst case (over all initial positions) expected meeting time m* of two random walks multiplied by . We demonstrate that this is, indeed, a tight bound; i.e. there is a graph G (a special case of the “lollipop” graph), a range of values k
Abstract: We consider a security problem on a distributed network.
We assume a network whose nodes are vulnerable to infection
by threats (e.g. viruses), the attackers. A system security
software, the defender, is available in the system. However,
due to the network˘s size, economic and performance reasons,
it is capable to provide safety, i.e. clean nodes from
the possible presence of attackers, only to a limited part of
it. The objective of the defender is to place itself in such a
way as to maximize the number of attackers caught, while
each attacker aims not to be caught.
In [7], a basic case of this problem was modeled as a
non-cooperative game, called the Edge model. There, the
defender could protect a single link of the network. Here,
we consider a more general case of the problem where the
defender is able to scan and protect a set of k links of the
network, which we call the Tuple model. It is natural to expect
that this increased power of the defender should result
in a better quality of protection for the network. Ideally,
this would be achieved at little expense on the existence and
complexity of Nash equilibria (profiles where no entity can
improve its local objective unilaterally by switching placements
on the network).
In this paper we study pure and mixed Nash equilibria
in the model. In particular, we propose algorithms for computing
such equilibria in polynomial time and we provide a
polynomial-time transformation of a special class of Nash
equilibria, called matching equilibria, between the Edge
model and the Tuple model, and vice versa. Finally, we
establish that the increased power of the defender results in
higher-quality protection of the network.
