Abstract: A mimicking network for a k-terminal network, N, is one whose realizable external flows are
the same as those of N. Let S.k/ denote the minimum size of a mimicking network for a k-terminal network.
In this paper we give new constructions of mimicking networks and prove the following results (the values
in brackets are the previously best known results): S.4/ D 5 [216], S.5/ D 6 [232]. For bounded treewidth
networks we show S.k/ D O.k/ [22k ], and for outerplanar networks we show S.k/ · 10k ˇ 6 [k22kC2].

Abstract: Two important performance parameters of distributed, rate-based flow control algorithms are their locality and convergence complexity. The former is characterized by the amount of global knowledge that is available to their scheduling mechanisms, while the latter is defined as the number of update operations performed on rates of individual sessions until max-min fairness is reached. Optimistic algorithms allow any session to intermediately receive a rate larger than its max-min fair rate; bottleneck algorithms finalize the rate of a session only if it is restricted by a certain, highly congested link of the network. In this work, we present a comprehensive collection of lower and upper bounds on convergence complexity, under varying degrees of locality, for optimistic, bottleneck, rate-based flow control algorithms. Say that an algorithm is oblivious if its scheduling mechanism uses no information of either the session rates or the network topology. We present a novel, combinatorial construction of a capacitated network, which we use to establish a fundamental lower bound of dn 4 + n 2 on the convergence complexity of any oblivious algorithm, where n is the number of sessions laid out on a network, and d, the session dependency, is a measure of topological dependencies among sessions. Moreover, we devise a novel simulation proof to establish that, perhaps surprisingly, the lower bound of dn 4 + n 2 on convergence complexity still holds for any partially oblivious algorithm, in which the scheduling mechanism is allowed to use information about session rates, but is otherwise unaware of network topology. On the positive side, we prove that the lower bounds for oblivious and partially oblivious algorithms are both tight. We do so by presenting optimal oblivious algorithms, which converge after dn 2 + n 2 update operations are performed in the worst case. To complete the picture, we show that linear convergence complexity can indeed be achieved if information about both session rates and network topology is available to schedulers. We present a counterexample, nonoblivious algorithm, which converges within an optimal number of n update operations. Our results imply a surprising convergence complexity collapse of oblivious and partially oblivious algorithms, and a convergence complexity separation between (partially) oblivious and nonoblivious algorithms for optimistic, bottleneck rate-based flow control.

Abstract: Intuitively, Braess’s paradox states that destroying a part of a network may improve the common latency of selfish flows at Nash equilibrium. Such a paradox is a pervasive phenomenon in real-world networks. Any administrator who wants to improve equilibrium delays in selfish networks, is facing some basic questions:
– Is the network paradox-ridden?
– How can we delete some edges to optimize equilibrium flow delays?
– How can we modify edge latencies to optimize equilibrium flow delays?
Unfortunately, such questions lead to View the MathML sourceNP-hard problems in general. In this work, we impose some natural restrictions on our networks, e.g. we assume strictly increasing linear latencies. Our target is to formulate efficient algorithms for the three questions above. We manage to provide:
– A polynomial-time algorithm that decides if a network is paradox-ridden, when latencies are linear and strictly increasing.
– A reduction of the problem of deciding if a network with (arbitrary) linear latencies is paradox-ridden to the problem of generating all optimal basic feasible solutions of a Linear Program that describes the optimal traffic allocations to the edges with constant latency.
– An algorithm for finding a subnetwork that is almost optimal wrt equilibrium latency. Our algorithm is subexponential when the number of paths is polynomial and each path is of polylogarithmic length.
– A polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding the best subnetwork which outperforms any known approximation for the case of strictly increasing linear latencies.
– A polynomial-time method that turns the optimal flow into a Nash flow by deleting the edges not used by the optimal flow, and performing minimal modifications on the latencies of the remaining ones.
Our results provide a deeper understanding of the computational complexity of recognizing the most severe manifestations of Braess’s paradox, and our techniques show novel ways of using the probabilistic method and of exploiting convex separable quadratic programs.

Abstract: Flow control is the main technique currently used to prevent some of the ordered traffic from entering a communication network, and to avoid congestion. A challenging aspect of flow control is how to treat all sessions "fairly " when it is necessary to turn traffic away from the network. In this work, we show how to extend the theory of max-min fair flow control to the case where priorities are assigned to different varieties of traffic, which are sensitive to traffic levels. We examine priorities expressible in the general form of increasing functions of rates, considering yet in combination the more elaborative case with unescapable upper and lower bounds on rates of traffic sessions. We offer optimal, priority bottleneck algorithms, which iteratively adjust the session rates in order to meet a new condition of max-min fairness under priorities and rate bounds. In our setting, which is realistic for today's technology of guaranteed quality of service, traffic may be turned away not only to avoid congestion, but also to respect particular minimum requirements on bandwidth. Moreover, we establish lower bounds on the competitiveness of network-oblivious schemes compared to optimal schemes with complete knowledge of network structure. Our theory extends significantly the classical theory of max-min fair flow control [2]. Moreover, our results on rejected traffic are fundamentally different from those related to call control and bandwidth allocation, since not only do we wish to optimize the number and rates of accepted sessions, but we also require priority fairness.

Abstract: We provide an improved FPTAS for multiobjective shortest paths—a fundamental (NP-hard) problem in multiobjective optimization—along with a new generic method for obtaining FPTAS to any multiobjective optimization problem with non-linear objectives. We show how these results can be used to obtain better approximate solutions to three related problems, multiobjective constrained [optimal] path and non-additive shortest path, that have important applications in QoS routing and in traffic optimization. We also show how to obtain a FPTAS to a natural generalization of the weighted multicommodity flow problem with elastic demands and values that models several realistic scenarios in transportation and communication networks.

Abstract: We consider a fundamental problem, called QoS-aware Multicommodity Flow, for assessing robustness in transportation planning.
It constitutes a natural generalization of the weighted multicommodity
flow problem, where the demands and commodity values are elastic to
the Quality-of-Service (QoS) characteristics of the underlying network.
The problem is also fundamental in other domains beyond transportation
planning. In this work, we provide an extensive experimental study of
two FPTAS for the QoS-aware Multicommodity Flow Problem enhanced
with several heuristics, and show the superiority of a new heuristic we
introduce here.

Abstract: In routing games, the network performance at equilibrium can be significantly improved if we remove some edges from the network. This counterintuitive fact, widely known as Braess's paradox, gives rise to the (selfish) network design problem, where we seek to recognize routing games suffering from the paradox, and to improve the equilibrium performance by edge removal. In this work, we investigate the computational complexity and the approximability of the network design problem for non-atomic bottleneck routing games, where the individual cost of each player is the bottleneck cost of her path, and the social cost is the bottleneck cost of the network. We first show that bottleneck routing games do not suffer from Braess's paradox either if the network is series-parallel, or if we consider only subpath-optimal Nash flows. On the negative side, we prove that even for games with strictly increasing linear latencies, it is NP-hard not only to recognize instances suffering from the paradox, but also to distinguish between instances for which the Price of Anarchy (PoA) can decrease to 1 and instances for which the PoA is as large as \Omega(n^{0.121}) and cannot improve by edge removal. Thus, the network design problem for such games is NP-hard to approximate within a factor of O(n^{0.121-\eps}), for any constant \eps > 0. On the positive side, we show how to compute an almost optimal subnetwork w.r.t. the bottleneck cost of its worst Nash flow, when the worst Nash flow in the best subnetwork routes a non-negligible amount of flow on all used edges. The running time is determined by the total number of paths, and is quasipolynomial when the number of paths is quasipolynomial.

Abstract: This paper studies the data gathering problem in wireless networks, where data generated at the nodes has to be collected at a single sink. We investigate the relationship between routing optimality and fair resource management. In particular, we prove that for energy balanced data propagation, Pareto optimal routing and flow maximization are equivalent, and also prove that flow maximization is equivalent to maximizing the network lifetime. We algebraically characterize the network structures in which energy balanced data flows are maximal. Moreover, we algebraically characterize communication links which are not used by an optimal flow. This leads to the characterization of minimal network structures supporting the maximal flows.
We note that energy balance, although implying global optimality, is a local property that can be computed efficiently and in a distributed manner. We suggest online distributed algorithms for energy balance in different optimal network structures and numerically show their stability in particular setting. We remark that although the results obtained in this paper have a direct consequence in energy saving for wireless networks they do not limit themselves to this type of networks neither to energy as a resource. As a matter of fact, the results are much more general and can be used for any type of network and different type of resources.

Abstract: This paper studies the data gathering problem in wireless networks, where data generated at the nodes has to be collected at a single sink. We investigate the relationship between routing optimality and fair resource management. In particular, we prove that for energy-balanced data propagation, Pareto optimal routing and flow maximization are equivalent, and also prove that flow maximization is equivalent to maximizing the network lifetime. We algebraically characterize the network structures in which energy-balanced data flows are maximal. Moreover, we algebraically characterize communication links which are not used by an optimal flow. This leads to the characterization of minimal network structures supporting the maximal flows.
We note that energy-balance, although implying global optimality, is a local property that can be computed efficiently and in a distributed manner. We suggest online distributed algorithms for energy-balance in different optimal network structures and numerically show their stability in particular setting. We remark that although the results obtained in this paper have a direct consequence in energy saving for wireless networks they do not limit themselves to this type of networks neither to energy as a resource. As a matter of fact, the results are much more general and can be used for any type of network and different types of resources.

Abstract: We consider the QoS-aware Multicommodity Flow problem,
a natural generalization of the weighted multicommodity flow problem
where the demands and commodity values are elastic to the Quality-of-
Service characteristics of the underlying network. The problem is fundamental
in transportation planning and also has important applications
beyond the transportation domain. We provide a FPTAS for the QoSaware
Multicommodity Flow problem by building upon a Lagrangian
relaxation method and a recent FPTAS for the non-additive shortest
path problem.

Abstract: Braess’s paradox states that removing a part of a network may im-
prove the players’ latency at equilibrium. In this work, we study the approxima-
bility of the best subnetwork problem for the class of random
G
n;p
instances
proven prone to Braess’s paradox by (Roughgarden and Valiant, RSA 2010) and
(Chung and Young, WINE 2010). Our main contribution is a polynomial-time
approximation-preserving reduction of the best subnetwork problem for such in-
stances to the corresponding problem in a simplified network where all neighbors
of
s
and
t
are directly connected by
0
latency edges. Building on this, we obtain
an approximation scheme that for any constant
" >
0
and with high probabil-
ity, computes a subnetwork and an
"
-Nash flow with maximum latency at most
(1+
"
)
L
+
"
, where
L
is the equilibrium latency of the best subnetwork. Our ap-
proximation scheme runs in polynomial time if the random network has average
degree
O
(poly(ln
n
))
and the traffic rate is
O
(poly(lnln
n
))
, and in quasipoly-
nomial time for average degrees up to
o
(
n
)
and traffic rates of
O
(poly(ln
n
))
.

Abstract: We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable routing flow games and also job allocation games. The congestion of a resource is the sum of the weights of the players that use it and the player's cost function is the sum of the utilities of the resources on its strategy. The social cost is the total weighted sum of the player's costs. The quality of Nash equilibria is determined by the price of anarchy (PoA) which expresses how much worse is the social outcome in the worst equilibrium versus the optimal coordinated solution. In the literature the predominant work has only been on games with polynomial utility costs, where it has been proven that the price of anarchy is bounded by the degree of the polynomial. However, no results exist on general bounds for non-polynomial utility functions.
Here, we consider general versions of these games in which the utility of each resource is an arbitrary non-decreasing function of the congestion. In particular, we consider a large family of superpolynomial utility functions which are asymptotically larger than any polynomial. We demonstrate that for every such function there exist games for which the price of anarchy is unbounded and increasing with the number of players (even if they have infinitesimal weights) while network resources remain fixed. We give tight lower and upper bounds which show this dependence on the number of players. Furthermore we provide an exact characterization of the PoA of all congestion games whose utility costs are bounded above by a polynomial function. Heretofore such results existed only for games with polynomial cost functions.

Abstract: Let M be a single s-t network of parallel links with load dependent latency functions shared by an infinite number of selfish users. This may yield a Nash equilibrium with unbounded Coordination Ratio [E. Koutsoupias, C. Papadimitriou, Worst-case equilibria, in: 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, STACS, vol. 1563, 1999, pp. 404-413; T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, How bad is selfish routing? in: 41st IEEE Annual Symposium of Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS, 2000, pp. 93-102]. A Leader can decrease the coordination ratio by assigning flow {\'a}r on M, and then all Followers assign selfishly the (1-{\'a})r remaining flow. This is a Stackelberg Scheduling Instance(M,r,{\'a}),0≤{\'a}≤1. It was shown [T. Roughgarden, Stackelberg scheduling strategies, in: 33rd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC, 2001, pp. 104-113] that it is weakly NP-hard to compute the optimal Leader's strategy. For any such network M we efficiently compute the minimum portion @b"M of flow r>0 needed by a Leader to induce M's optimum cost, as well as her optimal strategy. This shows that the optimal Leader's strategy on instances (M,r,@a>=@b"M) is in P. Unfortunately, Stackelberg routing in more general nets can be arbitrarily hard. Roughgarden presented a modification of Braess's Paradox graph, such that no strategy controlling {\'a}r flow can induce ≤1/{\'a} times the optimum cost. However, we show that our main result also applies to any s-t net G. We take care of the Braess's graph explicitly, as a convincing example. Finally, we extend this result to k commodities. A conference version of this paper has appeared in [A. Kaporis, P. Spirakis, The price of optimum in stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions, in: 18th annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, 2006, pp. 19-28]. Some preliminary results have also appeared as technical report in [A.C. Kaporis, E. Politopoulou, P.G. Spirakis, The price of optimum in stackelberg games, in: Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, ECCC, (056), 2005].

Abstract: In this paper we study the threshold behavior of the fixed radius random graph model and its applications to the key management problem of sensor networks and, generally, for mobile ad-hoc networks. We show that this random graph model can realistically model the placement of nodes within a certain region and their interaction/sensing capabilities (i.e. transmission range, light sensing sensitivity etc.). We also show that this model can be used to define key sets for the network nodes that satisfy a number of good properties, allowing to set up secure communication with each other depending on randomly created sets of keys related to their current location. Our work hopes to inaugurate a study of key management schemes whose properties are related to properties of an appropriate random graph model and, thus, use the rich theory developed in the random graph literature in order to transfer ?good? properties of the graph model to the key sets of the nodes.
Partially supported by the IST Programme of the European Union under contact number IST-2005-15964 (AEOLUS) and the INTAS Programme under contract with Ref. No 04-77-7173 (Data Flow Systems: Algorithms and Complexity (DFS-AC)).